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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

In Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp., a divided Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the state constitutional right to a jury trial applied
to individuals bringing suit under the retaliatory discharge
2
3
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). The court
determined, as a matter of law, that the nature of the controversy
overrode the default presumption that matters arising under the
4
WCA are not entitled to jury trials.
This case note first provides an abbreviated history of the civil
5
6
right to a jury trial, the WCA, and the evolving claim of retaliatory
7
discharge. It then fuses these histories and discusses jury trials in
cases where an employee is discharged in retaliation for exercising
8
his or her workers’ compensation rights.
This note then turns to the Schmitz decision, recounting both
9
the majority and dissenting opinions. Although this note finds the
court ultimately came to the correct conclusion, it contends that
the court erred by finding that section 176.82 of the WCA was
10
unambiguous. It explores an additional avenue of analysis—
1. Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz III), 852 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Minn.
2014).
2. MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1 (2014).
3. See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862.
4. See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677 (citing Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin,
639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
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statutory interpretation—which further supports the Schmitz
11
holding. The court ought to have compensated for ambiguities
within the WCA, whether by applying textual canons of
12
13
construction or employing the purposive approach.
II. HISTORY
The instant matter—civil jury trials in retaliatory discharge
actions arising under the WCA—exists at the intersection of several
legal spheres, including employment law, workers’ compensation,
and the judge/jury dichotomy. In order to understand the Schmitz
holding, it is critical to understand the history of these underlying
topics. This historical overview juggles several issues simultaneously:
(1) civil jury trials, (2) the workers’ compensation system, and (3)
retaliatory discharge claims. Ultimately, these three topics will be
woven together, forming a fabric that provides the framework for
the Schmitz decision.
A.

The Civil Right to a Jury Trial

Although the origins of the civil right to a jury trial are
14
debated, the history is clearer when honing in on the civil right to
15
a jury trial in America. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury “[i]n [s]uits at
16
common law.” Minnesota drafted its own constitution in 1857
17
before it achieved statehood in 1858. Minnesota’s Constitution
11. See infra Part IV.B–.C.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See Grant M. Borgen, Note, Civil Procedure: The Civil Right to a Jury Trial
and What It Means for Minnesota Creditors in Light of United Prairie Bank-Mountain
Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 247
n.15 (2012) (juxtaposing sources which contest whether the civil right to a jury
trial is traceable to the Magna Carta).
15. See id. at 247–49. Even in America, the civil right to jury trial was initially
debated prior to its inclusion in the federal Constitution. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
. . . .”).
17. Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 295–99 (2002). See generally Douglas A. Hedin, The
Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s Constitutional Past, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 242–45 (2003) (providing a history of the evolution of
Minnesota’s Constitution).
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provides a similar, but distinct, guarantee as compared to the U.S.
18
Constitution. This is important because the Seventh Amendment
19
does not apply to states, making federal precedent persuasive but
20
not precedential in Minnesota.
Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution states that
“[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend
21
to all cases at law . . . .” The case of Ewert v. City of Winthrop
established that the civil right to jury trial “must be found either in
22
the Minnesota Constitution or provided specifically by statute.”
When there is no explicit statutory grant for jury trial, the focus of
the inquiry is whether the claim is an action at law, for which the
constitution guarantees a jury trial, or an action in equity, to which
23
no similar right attaches.
Minnesota courts evaluate whether a cause of action would
have been entitled to a jury trial at the time the Minnesota
24
Constitution was adopted in 1857. However, the right to jury trial
25
is not frozen to only causes of action that existed in 1857. Recent
Minnesota Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the right to
jury trial instead depends on the general “nature and character of
26
the controversy.” This involves examining the nature of the claim
(at law or in equity) and the nature of the relief sought (damages
27
versus injunctive relief). If the party brings a claim at law and
28
seeks damages, there is a constitutional right to a jury trial.
18. Notably, Minnesota does not require a minimum amount of damages.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
19. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 645–46 (1973).
20. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988).
21. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added); cf. United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“[T]he interest in fairness and reliability protected by
the right to jury trial—a common law right that defendants enjoyed for centuries
. . . has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”).
22. Ewert v. City of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 1979).
23. Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002). This
dichotomy between legal and equitable actions often boils down to whether the
parties seek monetary damages (legal) or injunctive relief (equitable). See Bond v.
Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 43–44, 63 N.W. 3, 3–4 (1895).
24. Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn.
2001).
25. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
813 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2012) (citing Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349).
26. Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353.
27. Id. However, “seeking monetary relief is not enough by itself to guarantee
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Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act
29

The WCA is a much more recent development than the right
30
to jury trial. In Minnesota, workers’ compensation legislation was
31
first enacted in 1913 and has been compulsory since 1937. The
WCA was “devised to provide protection to workmen in the form of
compensation for injuries arising from hazards having a reasonable
32
relation to [their] employment . . . .” The workers’ compensation
system is “based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights
33
and defenses by employers and employees alike.” The Act was
34
35
overhauled in 1983 and amended significantly in 1995.
1.

Protecting Workers: A Historical Perspective
36

Minnesota was one of the first states to enact a workers’
compensation act; New York passed the first compulsory workers’

a jury trial . . . . While claims for money damages are typically legal claims, a party
should not be permitted to cloak or disguise an equitable action simply by its
prayer for relief.” Id. (citation omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court, when
determining whether a claim warrants a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment,
places greater emphasis on the remedy sought than does the Minnesota Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
28. See Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353.
29. MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2014).
30. Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967)
(calling the WCA “a salutary social development”).
31. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (current version at
MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.861); see also Act of Mar. 12, 1937, ch. 64, 1937 Minn.
Laws 109, 111 (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.021–.031).
32. Jones, 277 Minn. at 277, 152 N.W.2d at 358–59.
33. MINN. STAT. § 176.001.
34. See generally Leslie Altman et al., Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Scheme:
The Effects and Effectiveness of the 1983 Amendments, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843,
864 (1987) (analyzing substantive changes resulting from 1983 amendments).
35. See generally Thomas L. Johnson & Catherine J. Wasson, The Minnesota
Workers’ Compensation Act: Amendments by the 1995 Minnesota Legislature, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1996) (detailing the impact of the 1995
amendments).
36. Minnesota was not only one of the first states to enact a workers’
compensation act, it was one of the three pioneering states to consider the
concept. Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers’ Safety and Health,
1877–1917, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/monoregsafepart06.htm (“In 1909 New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota set up
commissions to investigate the question of employers’ liability for accidents.”).
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37

compensation law in 1910, and by 1949 all states had similar laws
38
on the books. These legislative innovations protected workers
who, courtesy of the industrial revolution, were at great risk for
39
physical injuries on the job. This was part of the momentum from
progressive era reforms wherein the government intervened on the
40
formerly sacrosanct freedom of contract in order to protect
41
individuals from industry. Although textbooks often focus on
legislative efforts to safeguard child laborers and curtail the
workday, the enactment of workers’ compensation laws is an oft42
forgotten landmark in the history of workers’ rights. Acts like
Minnesota’s WCA were truly revolutionary, abandoning the
common-law principles of contributory negligence and assumption
43
of the risk in cases involving workplace injuries in exchange for
44
statutorily guaranteed compensation regardless of fault.
37. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945. Notably, however,
New York’s law covered only certain dangerous types of employment. Barry
Bennett, Workers’ Compensation and the Laborer: Reflections of an Uninjured Jurist, 11
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211, 214–15 (1990).
38. The U.S. Supreme Court held New York’s workers’ compensation laws
constitutional in 1917, at which point “the path of reform was clear” to the rest of
the nation. Bennett, supra note 37, at 215.
39. Id. at 212 (“The industrial revolution was not always kind to the laborer.
. . . [M]echanization was cutting off not just spirit but arms and legs as well . . . .”).
40. Law students will surely remember the infamous Lochner era in which
courts relied on freedom of contract principles to strike down regulatory
legislation. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the
American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991) (“In Due Process
Clause disputes, the judges delimited governmental power over private property
by fleshing out the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘liberty of contract.’”).
41. In the early 1900s, progressives were no longer content with employers
bearing sole responsibility for the health and safety of workers. They sought the
help of a higher power—the government—to achieve their reform goals. In 1911,
Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel voiced these concerns at an
industrial safety conference, stating that “it takes the government to establish the
rules of the game” to ensure that workers are properly protected. See MacLaury,
supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., AARON H. CAPLAN, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 229–30 (2015).
43. See, e.g., Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992)
(“The Act . . . was designed to give workers immediate recovery for their injuries
suffered while on the job, without regard to the common law’s ‘three evil sisters,’
contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk.”); see also
Marco Heimann, Experimental Studies on Moral Values in Finance: Windfall
Gains, Socially Responsible Investment, and Compensation Plans 14 (Dec. 10,
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toulouse), http://
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Protecting Employers: Providing an Exclusive Remedy

In exchange for the protections afforded by workers’
compensation acts, employees generally must abandon tort causes
45
of action against employers. This is known as “exclusivity,” and it is
46
47
codified in the WCA and enforced in case law. The benefit to
employers is that, although they give up common-law defenses, they
receive limited statutory liability and are exempt from jury
48
49
verdicts. Some sources call this trade-off “quid pro quo” or refer
www.frenchsif.org/isr/wp-content/uploads/PhD-Marco-Heimann.pdf (discussing
how some industries even required employees to give up their right to sue for
injury at the outset of their employment, signing contracts known as “death
contracts” or the “worker’s right to die”).
44. Although the workers’ compensation coverage of workplace injury
claims, regardless of fault, provided a benefit to employees, there was a clear
sacrifice made. Employees gave up the right to jury trial, forgoing the opportunity
for a jury of peers to evaluate the case and instead abiding by statutorily
predetermined remedies. See, e.g., Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145,
1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (“The [Workers’s Compensation] Act took away from the
employee the right to sue in tort in exchange for his right[s] under the Act.”).
45. Thomas F. Coleman, Fundamentals of Workers’ Compensation in Minnesota,
41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2015). There are very limited circumstances
wherein an employee may pursue a tort cause of action. Id.
The employee may sue the employer in tort if the employer: (1) is
uninsured for workers’ compensation liability or fails to be self-insured
as required by . . . [section] 176.031, (2) intentionally injures or
assaults the employee, (3) is subject to liability under federal law (e.g.,
liability under the American [sic] with Disabilities Act), (4) is liable
under . . . [section] 176.82 in district court, or (5) is liable under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.
Id. at 1292 n.12.
46. See MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (2014) (“The liability of an employer . . . is
exclusive and in the place of any other liability . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co., 403 N.W.2d 643, 643 (Minn. 1987)
(answering certified question and finding that the exclusive remedy provision
within the WCA barred employee’s products liability action against employer who
manufactured insulation containing asbestos).
48. Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers’ Compensation Claim:
The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 551 (1986); see also
Bennett, supra note 37, at 211–12 (suggesting that the compensation system was an
“attempt[] by corporations to reduce the costs of injury and avoid potentially
ruinous jury verdicts”). But what is the rationale for omitting jury trials in workers’
compensation cases? Perhaps it is for the sake of simplicity or consistency. See
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. 1984) (“The amount of
compensation is limited and determined according to a definite schedule rather
than left to the vagaries of a jury verdict.”).
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50

to it as the “compensation bargain.” Scholars aptly point out,
however, that this exchange of rights and remedies initially did not
contemplate a cause of action for race-based discrimination or
51
retaliatory discharge, for example.
The exclusive remedy
52
conception was limited to physical injuries. Minnesota courts in
particular have been consistently unwilling to violate the exclusivity
principle “without a clear manifestation of legislative intent to do
53
so.”

49. Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.
2004) (“The exclusive remedy provision ‘is part of the quid pro quo of the workers’
compensation scheme . . . .’” (quoting Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180,
183–84 (Minn. 1989))).
50. See, e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 159
(Ct. App. 1996).
51. See Ellyn Moscowitz, Outside the “Compensation Bargain:” Protecting the Rights
of Workers Disabled on the Job to File Suits for Disability Discrimination, 37 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 587, 594 (1997) (noting that civil rights causes of action did not even exist
when workers’ compensation legislation was first enacted).
52. See id. at 598.
53. Karst, 447 N.W.2d at 185. Perhaps the most extreme example of the
judiciary’s unwillingness to infringe on the legislature’s territory can be seen in
McGowan v. Our Savior’s Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 842–43 (Minn. 1995). In
McGowan, the plaintiff’s tort action for negligence against her employer was
barred by the exclusivity principle where she had already received workers’
compensation benefits for the physical injuries sustained as a result of being raped
in the workplace. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834. This stringent adherence to the
exclusivity principle seems to fly in the face of public policy and may explain why
some states have a judicially created public policy exception. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text. Although Minnesota courts did not rely on the public policy
exception in acknowledging a right to a civil action for retaliatory discharge, other
states have. See, e.g., Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977) (“To accept defendant’s argument here [that the exclusivity principle
overrides a plaintiff’s right to a retaliatory discharge action] would be to say to the
employee, ‘Although you have no right to a tort action, you have a right to a
workmen’s compensation claim which, while it may mean less money, is a sure
thing. However, if you exercise that right, we will fire you.’”).
Notably, section 176.82 of the WCA is construed narrowly. Elizabeth Raleigh
hypothesized that it has “consistently been construed narrowly because it is the
only part of the workers’ compensation scheme that allows an employee to recover
damages” and that this “narrow construction is necessary to comply with the
mandate of exclusivity.” Elizabeth A. Raleigh, A Survey of Important Decisions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court; The 1990–1991 Term, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 262, 264
(1992).
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The Structure of the Workers’ Compensation System

A predicate to understanding what makes a civil action with a
civil jury trial so novel under the WCA is an understanding of how
the workers’ compensation system operates—outside of civil courts
54
and without jury trials. If an employee suffers a work-related injury
55
or illness, the employer files a First Report of Injury. This
56
57
commences the coverage process. Then, without regard to fault,
the employer’s insurer covers expenses such as wage loss, medical
58
costs, disability benefits, and rehabilitation. The employee cannot
59
recover damages such as pain and suffering. Most workers’
compensation cases end here, but the case may progress into
litigation if disputes persist.
Workers’ compensation is a branch of administrative law, so
60
the dispute is not handled by the courts. The system is
administered by the Workers’ Compensation Division of the
61
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. In a contested
case, the employee would initiate his or her claim by filing a Claim
62
63
Petition, which triggers a discovery process and alternative

54. See Matheson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 297, 148 N.W.
71, 76 (1914) (discussing how although the state constitution secures the right to
jury trial, where employers and employees are subject to the WCA, “they thereby
waive a jury trial . . . .”).
55. Workers’ Compensation—Forms: First Report of Injury, MINN. DEP’T LABOR &
INDUS., http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Fr01info.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
56. Id.
57. But see Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31
FAM. L.Q. 269, 292 (1997) (“Remedial ‘no-fault’ legislation . . . is seldom truly ‘nofault’ in nature. . . . [N]one of these . . . laws totally abolishes or abrogates a
defendant’s responsibility or accountability for his or her actions involving serious
or egregious conduct.”).
58. MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
TRAINING FOR EMPLOYERS 8–10 (Mar. 2015), http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Pdf
/wc_ertrainingguide.pdf.
59. MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEP’T, INFORMATION BRIEF:
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 2 (1998) [hereinafter INFORMATION BRIEF], http://
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/workcomp.pdf.
60. See, e.g., OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://www.mn.gov/oah (last visited Feb.
8, 2016).
61. MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DIVISION
PROFILE 1 (2011), http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Pdf/wcadminprofile.pdf.
62. MINN. STAT. § 176.271 (2014) (“[A]ll proceedings under this chapter are
initiated by the filing of a written petition on a prescribed form.”).
63. Workers’ Compensation: Litigation Process, MINN. DEP’T LABOR & INDUS.,
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64

dispute resolution. If the matter does not settle, there is a hearing
65
before a compensation judge at the Office of Administrative
66
Hearings. These judges are not bound by traditional procedural
67
or evidentiary rules. After the judge issues a decision, the parties
68
can appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals and
69
ultimately the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system provides a
streamlined administrative process, which aims to avoid the delays
70
of traditional litigation and the inconsistencies of jury verdicts.
This structure, however, is geared towards straightforward personal
71
72
injury cases. The WCA provides tidy numerical formulas to
73
compensate a worker who loses a leg or is exposed to toxic
74
chemicals in the workplace. The WCA does not contemplate, let
alone calculate, the precise value of an intangible injury like
75
retaliatory discharge.

http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/FaqLitigation.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
64. Workers’ Compensation: Alternative Dispute-Resolution Services, MINN. DEP’T
LABOR & INDUS., http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/DispRes.asp (last visited Feb. 8,
2016).
65. MINN. STAT. § 176.341.
66. INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 59, at 7.
67. Id.
68. MINN. STAT. § 176.421.
69. INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 59, at 10.
70. Id. (noting the uncertainty and unpredictability of the tort system for
employees and employers alike).
71. See MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (referencing “the quick and efficient delivery of
indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers” (emphasis added)).
72. See, e.g., id. § 176.101 (setting forth the compensation schedule,
calculating weekly wages, valuing impairment ratings, etc.).
73. The WCA provides coverage for “personal injury,” which encompasses
both mental impairments and physical injuries that “aris[e] out of and in the
course of employment.” Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 16.
74. See id. § 176.66 (“The disablement of an employee resulting from an
occupational disease shall be regarded as a personal injury within the meaning of
the workers’ compensation law.”).
75. See id. § 176.001 (describing the intent of the legislature “to assure the
quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers
at a reasonable cost to the employers,” without any mention of or allusion to
compensating employees for non-physical problems).
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Retaliatory Discharge: An Evolving Cause of Action

In addition to providing relief for on-the-job injuries,
Minnesota’s WCA contains a special provision in section 176.82
that prohibits employers from discharging an employee for seeking
76
workers’ compensation benefits. This prohibition on retaliatory
77
78
discharge was enacted in 1975 and remains in effect today. The
79
statute creates an “action for civil damages,” echoing other
statutory rights of Minnesota employees to file civil suits for
80
retaliatory discharge. Because retaliatory discharge is the heart of
section 176.82 claims, this note will briefly explore the history of
81
the cause of action generally as well as its development in the
82
workers’ compensation context specifically.
1.

Retaliatory Discharge Generally

Nowadays, retaliatory discharge causes of action are
ubiquitous. For example, we take for granted that an employee
cannot be fired for his or her race, sexuality, or age. However, the
retaliatory discharge doctrine is a relatively recent development. In
1959, the groundbreaking California case of Petermann v.
83
International Brotherhood held that an employer’s right to discharge
an employee could be limited by statute or through considerations
84
of public policy. Prior to Petermann, the employment-at-will
doctrine prevailed, giving employers a great deal of discretion in
terminating employment relationships without much, if any,
76. Id. § 176.82, subdiv. 1.
77. While the terms retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination are
sometimes conflated, this case note relies on the more specific term “retaliatory
discharge” to describe employees who are fired in retaliation for some particular
act or refusal to act. See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352 (Minn.
2002) (calling retaliatory discharge “one type of wrongful discharge”).
78. Law of June 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 21, 1975 Minn. Laws 1188 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1).
79. MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1.
80. See, e.g., id. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1) (retaliation for whistleblowing); id.
§ 181.941, subdiv. 3 (retaliation for requesting parenting leave); id. § 181.9456,
subdiv. 3 (retaliation for leave for organ donation); id. § 182.65, subdiv. 2(b)(9)
(retaliation for making occupational safety and health complaint).
81. See infra Part II.C.1.
82. See infra Part II.C.2.
83. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
84. Id. at 27 (finding that employer could not fire employee for employee’s
refusal to commit perjury).
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85

oversight from the legislature or the judiciary. Although it was a
landmark decision, Petermann “stood alone and ignored for many
86
years.” It was not until the 1980s that Minnesota courts began to
87
carve away at the employment-at-will doctrine.
The exceptions to at-will employment are either grounded in
88
common law or enacted by statute. The overwhelming majority of
89
90
states have what is known as a public policy exception to the at85. Minnesota’s employment-at-will doctrine is generally traced to Skagerberg
v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 302, 266 N.W. 872, 877 (1936). The general
rule set out in Skagerberg is that employment “may be terminated by either party at
any time, and no action can be sustained in such case for a wrongful discharge.”
Id. The employer can fire an employee “for a good reason, for a bad reason, or for
no reason at all.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 156 (Minn.
2014) (Wright. J., dissenting) (citing Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minn.
Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 2002)). Despite a growing number of
causes of action for retaliatory discharge or workplace discrimination, the Eighth
Circuit is still reluctant for courts to become overinvolved in employee-employer
relations. See, e.g., Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir.
1995) (“[T]he employment discrimination laws have not vested in the federal
courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or
fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that
those judgments involve intentional discrimination.”).
86. R. Scott Oswald & Michael Vogelsang Jr., The ABCs of Common Law
Wrongful Termination Claims in the Washington Metropolitan Region, 3 LAB. & EMP. L.F.
197, 200 (2013).
87. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629–30 (Minn.
1983) (“[W]here an employment contract is for an indefinite duration, such
indefiniteness by itself does not preclude handbook provisions on job security
from being enforceable . . . .”). Nonetheless, the default presumption is still
employment at-will: “The usual employer-employee relationship is terminable at
the will of either . . . .” Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117
N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962); see, e.g., Ring v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1134 (D. Minn. 2003) (“Minnesota law preserves the long-standing
presumption of at-will employment, under which an employer can dismiss an
employee hired for an indefinite term at any time. Likewise, the employee is free
to terminate their employment at any time.”).
88. Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment
in Retaliation for Filing Workers’ Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (2015).
89. Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 159 (Minn. 2014) (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.07 (5th ed. Supp.
2013) (surveying states)).
90. There is no universal agreement on the proper definition of “public
policy.” The Petermann court, which adopted the public policy exception, explicitly
noted that the term is “inherently not subject to precise definition.” Petermann v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1959). The Illinois
Supreme Court attempted to pin down this nebulous concept:
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will presumption, a catchall cause of action that “arises every time
an employee’s termination results from an employer’s violation of a
91
clear mandate of public policy.” Minnesota, however, has not
embraced—either judicially or legislatively—this public policy
92
exception.

[P]ublic policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s
constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial
decisions. Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing
matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely
personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory
discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s
social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed
. . . . The cause of action is allowed where the public policy is clear, but
is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake.
Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878–79 (Ill. 1981) (compiling
cases nationwide where retaliatory discharge for violation of public policy has
either been allowed or disallowed). The sources of public policy might include
administrative agency rules, industry standards, codes of conduct, or even ethical
codes. Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the
Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 63, 73–74 (1989).
91. Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 151.
92. Sarah C. Steefel, Case Note, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463, 474–75 (1984). In Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the public policy exception
to be “persuasive” and announced that an employer “is liable if an employee is
discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy.” 396
N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). After the Minnesota Supreme Court
granted review, but before it released its decision, the legislature announced the
Whistleblower Act. See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352 (Minn.
2002) (recounting history of the contemplated public policy exception). As such,
the court no longer had to answer the policy-level question of whether or not to
recognize a common-law action for wrongful discharge. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571.
The Dukowitz case, decided before Schmitz in early 2014, revisited the public
policy exception issue. Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 148–49. The court again addressed
the question in the context of a plaintiff terminated after applying for
unemployment benefits and once again, the court declined to recognize a public
policy exception. Id. at 148–49. The Dukowitz court was loath to legislate from the
bench and usurp legislative power. See id. at 151–52. They exercised judicial
restraint based on a confidence that “the legislative process[] is equipped to
balance the competing interests of employers, employees, and the public.” Id. at
153–54. This deference to the legislative branch is particularly important in
relation to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of legislative. See infra Part
IV.C.
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Instead of establishing a blanket prohibition on retaliatory
discharge in the form of a public policy exception, the Minnesota
legislature has enacted specific statutes, such as section 176.82,
93
which carve out exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
Conceptually, if the original employment-at-will doctrine were a
slice of cheese, these carve-outs for retaliatory discharge would
convert the slice into Swiss cheese. Although Minnesota courts still
94
refer to employment at-will as the rule of thumb, the profusion of
exceptions (the holes in the Swiss cheese) has engulfed the rule.
There are now so many exceptions that the exceptions have
essentially become the rule.
The prima facie case for retaliatory discharge, whether a
common-law or statutory cause of action, is the same: the employee
must be exercising a constitutional or statutory right, the employee
must have been discharged, and there must be a causal relationship
95
between the aforementioned right and dismissal. In Minnesota, if
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to furnish a non-retaliatory motivation for the
discharge; if this burden is satisfied, the burden bounces back to
96
the plaintiff to show that the non-retaliatory motive is pretextual.
2.

Retaliatory Discharge in the Workers’ Compensation Context
97

The first recognition of retaliatory discharge for exercising
workers’ compensation rights came in 1973 with the Indiana case

93. Steefel, supra note 92, at 474 (compiling statutes that “create specific
public policy limitations to the general rule”); see also McDaniel v. United
Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn. 1991) (clarifying that section
176.82 is “not a codification of the common law” but rather an independent
statutory cause of action enacted “more than a decade before this court
recognized a common law action for retaliatory discharge”).
94. See, e.g., Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 150 (stating that “the employeremployee relationship is generally at-will”).
95. Love, supra note 48, at 566–67.
96. This burden shifting standard, familiar to most employment lawyers, is
known as the McDonnell Douglas standard. See Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,
472 N.W.2d 114, 119 n.7 (Minn. 1991) (“The three-step McDonnell Douglas test
must be used in analyzing a retaliatory discharge claim.”) (citation omitted). The
McDonnell Douglas standard applies to common-law and statutory claims alike. See
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Minn. 1987) (commonlaw wrongful discharge claim); Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427–
28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (statutory wrongful discharge claim).
97. Some sources incorrectly suggest that “[t]he retaliatory discharge cause
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98

Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. It was shortly thereafter that
99
Minnesota passed section 176.82. Some legal scholars opined that
100
this was a long time coming, but prior to 1973, several courts had
declined to recognize the workers’ compensation variety of
101
retaliatory discharge.
Approximately forty percent of the states recognize a similar
102
cause of action today.
Where courts were reluctant to
of action was initially devised by the courts to protect individuals filing for workers’
compensation.” Nancy K. Renfer, Corporate Counsels’ Lack of Retaliatory Discharge
Action, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 92 (1989). Yet, retaliatory discharge was recognized
in other settings before it was extended to the workers’ compensation context. See
supra in Part II.C.1. It is more accurate to state that “[o]ne of the first bases for
successful wrongful termination claims was in a workers’ compensation [context].”
Oswald & Vogelsang, supra note 86, at 200. Nonetheless, this extension to workers’
compensation was surely logical. After all, what good are the statutory protections
of a workers’ compensation act if employees can be terminated for asserting those
rights?
98. 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973) (“Prior to workmen’s compensation,
workers were faced with the harshness of the common law. The employee’s only
remedy was an action in tort against the employer—actions which were rarely
successful . . . . Workmen’s compensation statutes are in derogation of the
common law and provide, for those covered, an exclusive remedy for injuries
sustained ‘in the course of’ and ‘arising out of’ one’s employment.”).
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
100. 6 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION §§ 104–53
(2000) (“It is odd that such a decision was so long in coming.”). Other
commentators remarked on the timing of Frampton and speculated that perhaps
Congress’ recognition of a retaliatory discharge action in Title VII “paved the way”
for Frampton’s recognition of retaliatory discharge the workers’ compensation
setting. Love, supra note 48, at 554.
101. See, e.g., Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo.
1961); Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956); Raley v. Darling Shop, 59
S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1950). The courts’ rationale for rejecting this new cause of action
was often judicial deference and a commitment to exclusivity of workers’
compensation acts—the same principle that causes Minnesota courts today to be
hesitant to recognize a broad public policy exception for retaliatory discharge. See,
e.g., Christy, 295 S.W.2d at 127 (“We can hardly conceive of the legislature making
such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured employees
covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for recovery of damages
for wrongful discharge if there had been any intent to create such a right.”).
102. See 3 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 311:3, nn.14–15, Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2015) (compiling cases and statutes from nineteen states
which provide a civil remedy for plaintiffs discharged in retaliation for asserting
their workers’ compensation rights). In approximately two-thirds of the states that
recognize the cause of action, the source of the civil action is codified in a statute.
See id. (outlining seventeen statutes and two cases). See generally Theresa Ludwig
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acknowledge a common-law cause of action, the legislatures would
103
authorize civil remedies. Though the language of Minnesota’s
statute calls for a “civil action,” it does not specifically invoke the
104
right to a “civil jury trial.” There is a missing link between civil
action and civil jury trial, and it is in this liminal space that Schmitz
is situated.
3.

Jury Trials in Retaliatory Discharge Actions Generally

Jury trials in other, non-WCA retaliation cases are also relevant
105
to the historical background. In Abraham v. County of Hennepin,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that employees had a
constitutional right to a jury trial on their statutory wrongful
discharge claims under the Whistleblower Act and Minnesota’s
106
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Abraham court traced
the origins of wrongful discharge claims, which were historically
107
tried to juries, and found that the plaintiff’s statutory retaliatory
discharge claims, as a subcategory of wrongful discharge claims
108
generally, had an attendant right to a jury trial. Although the
court may not have realized the long-term impact of this holding,

Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing
Workers’ Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (2015) (collecting cases in which
courts consider the retaliatory discharge in the workers’ compensation context).
Notably, this issue of retaliatory discharge is generally seen as a state issue.
Although certain employment law is legislated at a federal level, workers’
compensation has been left to the states. There are less than a dozen cases at the
Supreme Court involving retaliatory discharge in the context of workers’
compensation benefits, and the Court’s decisions generally emphasize deference
to these state-run systems. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 411 (1988) (portraying the state law tort action for retaliatory discharge
in workers’ compensation context as a “separate font[] of substantive rights” that
should not be preempted by other federal labor laws). But see, e.g., Metro Live Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 61 (1987) (finding state retaliatory discharge claim to
be preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
103. See Love, supra note 48, at 559.
104. See MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (2014).
105. For an interesting discussion of the uniqueness of retaliation claims, see
David Sherwyn et al., Experimental Evidence That Retaliation Claims Are Unlike Other
Employment Discrimination Claims, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 455, 475–86 (2014).
106. 639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002) (involving claims for retaliatory
discharge under Whistleblower Act and Minnesota Occupational Safety and
Health Act).
107. Id. at 350–51.
108. Id. at 352–54.
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practitioners hypothesized that the logical extension of Abraham
109
would entitle other retaliation plaintiffs to jury trials as well.
D.

Jury Trials for Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Cases

The previous three sections—dealing with jury trials, workers’
compensation, and retaliatory discharge—can now be woven
together into the matter at issue in Schmitz: jury trials in retaliatory
discharge claims under the WCA.
Nationwide, many of the early workers’ compensation
110
But because
retaliatory discharge cases involved jury trials.
Minnesota’s statute does not explicitly mention jury trial,
Minnesota courts struggled to interpret the meaning of “civil
action.” The earliest Minnesota cases involving section 176.82
claims never delved into the jury trial issue, resolving the
111
112
controversies on other grounds or by bench trial. In 1987, the
109. Peter Gray & Andrew E. Tanick, Fresh Incentives to Whistle While You Work:
Whistleblower Claims After the Abraham and Anderson-Johanningmeier Cases, BENCH
& B. MINN., Apr. 2002, at 23, 24 (“Extended to its logical conclusion, the Abraham
holding indicates that plaintiffs seeking damages only under these [discrimination
and retaliation] statutes are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in state court—
regardless of any contrary statutory provisions which, naturally, must give way to
the superior weight of constitutional law.”). In a way, it seems like some of these
practitioners may have seen Schmitz coming down the pike a decade before the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari. See id. (mentioning an impending
“across-the-board expansion of the Minnesota wrongful discharge law”).
110. Interestingly, many of these juries were very plaintiff-friendly. See, e.g.,
Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667 (Ct. App. 1984) (jury verdict
in favor of employee); Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983) (“The jury found for Meadows and
assessed damages.”); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (jury verdict of $7,500 in actual damages and $17,500 in punitive damages);
Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 695 (W. Va. 1982) (jury
verdict of $40,000).
111. See, e.g., Morales v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1031, 1041
(D. Minn. 1979) (finding temporal issue fatal to section 176.82 claims where
employee filed workers’ compensation claim nine months after discharge);
Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (permitting
employer to obtain insurance coverage for section 176.82 claims); Schuyler v.
Metro. Transit Comm’n, 374 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissing
employee’s section 176.82 claims because employee failed to exhaust remedies in
collective bargaining agreement).
112. See, e.g., Jensen v. Hercules, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (bench trial); Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he case tried to the court without a jury.”).
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Minnesota Supreme Court answered a certified question and held
that a civil action brought under section 176.82 did not merge with
a workers’ compensation action for penalties under section 176.225
113
of the WCA. At this juncture, all that was clear was that section
176.82 cases were civil actions that belonged in district court rather
than the administrative workers’ compensation realm.
Minnesota courts then entered an era in the early 1990s where
they inexplicably began withholding jury trials in actions arising
114
under section 176.82. In 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court
intervened and indicated that a section 176.82 retaliatory discharge
action was a common-law cause of action “outside the purview” of
115
the WCA, suggesting that the lower courts had been incorrect to
116
deny plaintiffs jury trials. This gave rise to passive acceptance of
117
and eventually affirmative
jury trials in section 176.82 cases
118
support of the same.
Although generally workers’ compensation claims are resolved
119
by quasi-judicial compensation judges, Minnesota courts have
found a civil right to jury trial in other cases that originate in the
120
WCA, namely certain subrogation claims. It would therefore be a
113. Kaluza v. Home Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 230, 235 (Minn. 1987). This case is
particularly relevant in that Kaluza passively acknowledges the separateness of the
section 176.82 civil action from other actions arising under the WCA. Accord
Bergeson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1987) (portraying
section 176.82 action as a “separate and distinguishable” remedy, which still “gives
due deference to the exclusivity scheme of the [WCA]”).
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. Snap-On Tools, Inc., No. C8-93-1011, 1994 WL 6843,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1994) (“Anderson was not entitled to a jury trial
because his asserted claims fall under Minn. Stat. § 176.82.”); Snesrud v. Instant
Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a jury trial
was not required because there was no underlying common-law cause of action);
Flaherty v. Lindsay, 457 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Minn. Stat.
§ 176.82 does not specifically provide for a jury trial.”).
115. Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1995).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (discussing a retaliatory discharge jury instruction).
118. See, e.g., Brenden v. Westonka Pub. Sch., No. EM03-017571, 2005 WL
1936195, at *8 (D. Minn. June 10, 2005).
119. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
120. See Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1993).
But see Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 680 n.1 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., dissenting)
(“In Tyroll, the employer’s right to subrogation, not the actual cause of action, was
found in the [WCA]. This is a far different position than the case . . . in which the
cause of action itself . . . was established by the WCA.”).
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mischaracterization to say that absolutely no right to jury trial exists
for any claim connected to the WCA. Nonetheless, the default is
still that WCA claims are resolved by a compensation judge, not a
121
jury.
Across this timeline, though, it is at least clear that the
workers’ compensation courts understood a section 176.82 civil
action to mean a case within district court, separate from the
122
The very
administrative proceedings for on-the-job injuries.
limited commentary on the subject from the Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals on the matter makes no remark
one way or the other as to whether a section 176.82 civil action
123
implicates a civil jury trial.

121. See supra Part II.B.
122. This author searched the archives of the Workers’ Compensation Court
of Appeals (WCCA) in Minnesota for any and all decisions involving the term
“176.82” to see how the WCCA perceived these claims. The court consistently
acknowledged that such claims are venued in district court, not the workers’
compensation system. See Stange v. Dep’t of Transp., No. WC05-101, 2005 WL
3451183, at *12 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005) (stating that the
WCCA “ha[d] appellate jurisdiction only, and ha[d] no authority to act” on
employee’s request for review of alleged retaliatory discharge under section
176.82); Weidler v. Johanning Trans-Fare, Inc., No. WC05-147, 2005 WL 1901570,
at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (indicating that where a
settlement foreclosed the possibility of section 176.82 claim, “the enforceability of
such a closeout is to be determined by the district courts as opposed to the
[WCCA]”); Smith v. Receivable Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 2003 WL 783815, at *2 n.1
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (“The civil penalties and punitive
damages permitted under . . . § 176.82 . . . are arguably nonworkers’
compensation benefits, although they are referenced under our statute.”).
123. See supra note 122. What is interesting about this is that section 175A.01
states that the WCCA has jurisdiction over cases “aris[ing] under the workers’
compensation laws of the state.” MINN. STAT. § 175A.01 (2014). This creates
jurisdictional tension, as the retaliatory discharge statute simultaneously arises
within the WCA (where compensation judges have jurisdiction) while providing
for a separate civil action in district court (where the compensation judges would
not have jurisdiction). As a WCCA judge and staff attorney hinted after the 1995
amendments to section 176.82, more questions would “doubtless arise” from this
tricky subdivision: “Must a compensation judge consider this issue when
appropriate, and will findings in a workers’ compensation proceeding have any
impact on a subsequent civil action?” Johnson & Wasson, supra note 35, at 1532.
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III. THE SCHMITZ DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff Darrel Schmitz, who worked as a mechanic for U.S.
124
Steel, first injured his back at work in October 2006. He initially
did not file a worker’s compensation claim because a supervisor
125
allegedly threatened to fire him if he did. When a back injury at
home in December 2006 exacerbated his troubles, Schmitz filed a
126
claim in April 2007. He was unable to work until October 2007,
127
and even then he was given work restrictions. U.S. Steel made no
effort to allow Schmitz to return to work within his restrictions,
128
ultimately terminating him in January 2008.
129
Schmitz subsequently filed suit in May 2008. He alleged that
U.S. Steel discharged him in retaliation for seeking workers’
compensation benefits, in violation of section 176.82, subdivision 1.
He further alleged that U.S. Steel refused to offer him continued
130
employment, in violation of subdivision 2.
The case had a somewhat complicated history in the lower
131
courts. The district court initially granted summary judgment on
132
all claims in favor of the defendant, U.S. Steel. The court of
appeals reversed in part, permitting Schmitz’s claims for retaliatory
133
discharge under the WCA to proceed.
On remand, Schmitz amended his complaint to add a third
claim under section 176.82 for threatening to discharge him in
134
violation of subdivision 1. The district court denied his demand
124. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Minn. 2014).
125. Id.; see also Appellee’s Brief & Addendum at 1–2, Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d
669 (No. A12-0709), 2013 WL 9670848, at *4.
126. Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 8–9.
129. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 671.
130. Id. at 671–72; see also Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 1.
131. See Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 1, Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669 (No.
A12-0709), 2013 WL 9670847, at *1 (providing a timeline of relevant procedural
history).
132. In addition to bringing claims under section 176.82 of the WCA, plaintiff
asserted a disability discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 672.
133. Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz I), No. A10-0633, 2010 WL 4941668,
at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010).
134. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 672.
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for jury trial on the three section 176.82 claims he had accrued.
After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Schmitz on
this recently added threat-to-discharge claim, but rejected his
retaliatory discharge and refusal-to-offer-continued-employment
136
claims.
137
Both parties cross-appealed.
The court of appeals then
reversed in part, finding in relevant part that the retaliatory
discharge claims were entitled to a jury trial because they sought
138
only money damages, making them legal rather than equitable.
Defendant appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted
review to assess whether Schmitz had a right to a jury trial on his
139
WCA retaliatory discharge claims.
B.

The Majority Opinion: Affirming Abraham and Clarifying
Breimhorst

The right to a jury trial must either originate in the Minnesota
140
Constitution or in the express language of a statute. Admittedly,
the language of section 176.82 makes no explicit provision for a
141
“civil jury trial.” To the Schmitz court, this was straightforward as
can be: “The right to a jury trial . . . must arise from the Minnesota
142
Constitution.”
Regrettably, there was not even a cursory
discussion of the fact that the statute did not expressly provide for a
jury trial. There was also no consideration of the alternative—that

135. Id.
136. Id. The district court awarded Schmitz $15,000 in damages for emotional
distress; it further granted his motion for attorney fees in part, awarding an
additional $203,112. Id.
137. Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz II), 831 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2013).
138. Id. at 677.
139. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 670. The Minnesota Supreme Court also
addressed a secondary issue on appeal—whether an employer may assert a
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to vicarious liability for threat to discharge
claims—which will not be discussed. See id. at 677–78. The court, “[p]roviding no
additional comment,” ultimately declined to extend the Faragher/Ellerth defense
beyond sexual harassment claims. Stephen F. Befort, Retaliatory Discharge/Workers’
Compensation: Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. 852 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2014), in THE
41ST ANNUAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 16 (2014).
140. Ewert v. City of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 1979).
141. See MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (2014).
142. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 673 (“[T]he right to a jury trial in this case, if it
exists, must arise from the Minnesota Constitution.”).
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perhaps the statute did intend to provide for a jury trial, even if it
143
did so implicitly rather than explicitly.
Schmitz pursued the constitutional argument, asserting that
because his claim was legal in nature (seeking monetary damages
144
instead of equitable relief), he was entitled to a jury trial. U.S.
Steel pursued a statutory argument, maintaining that the
legislature precluded the right to jury trial when it created a new
145
set of rights and remedies under the WCA.
The court ultimately sided with Schmitz and pursued a purely
146
precedential argument. The majority affirmed the continuing
validity of Abraham, the analogous case involving retaliatory
147
discharge under the Whistleblower Act. Abraham had classified
retaliatory discharge claims as actions at law that deserved jury
148
trial. In other words, even if a statute fails to codify the right to
jury trial, the constitutional right to jury trial kicks in when the
149
statutory cause of action is legal in nature.
The court further clarified the meaning of Breimhorst v.
150
Beckman,
a 1949 case that U.S. Steel relied upon for the
151
exclusivity proposition. In that case, the plaintiff argued that the
WCA was void for denying her right to a jury trial on her personal
152
injury claims. The Breimhorst court disagreed, finding that the
WCA gave her an adequate substitute remedy despite depriving her
153
of a jury trial. In essence, Breimhorst stood for the adequacy of the
143. See id. (“Section 176.82 does not expressly provide such a right.”).
144. Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 11–12.
145. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 131, at 11–12.
146. See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 674–77.
147. Befort, supra note 139, at 16.
148. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 676; see supra Part II.C.3 (discussing Abraham);
see also Befort, supra note 139, at 16 (“The court determined that there was no
reason to treat Schmitz’s retaliatory discharge claim any differently [than the
retaliatory discharge claim in Abraham].”).
149. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 676–77 (“When a statutory cause of action is
legal in nature . . . there is a constitutional right to jury trial. . . . [T]he right to a
jury trial applies to all causes of action at law, regardless of whether the legislature
has codified the cause of action.” (quoting Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639
N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002))).
150. Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
151. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 674 (framing Defendant’s reliance on
Breimhorst as support for the “contention that a section 176.82 retaliatory discharge
claim is part and parcel of the WCA’s comprehensive statutory scheme”).
152. Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 434, 35 N.W.2d at 735.
153. Id. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 736 (“[W]e cannot say that the workmen’s
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exclusive remedy and the permissibility of disposing of jury trials in
the workers’ compensation context. The Schmitz court found this
inapposite in the instant matter, as the retaliatory discharge
damages were distinguishable from the workers’ compensation
154
benefits pursued in Breimhorst.
The court found that the
fundamental sameness between section 176.82 retaliatory discharge
claims and common-law retaliatory discharge overrode the
155
exclusivity principle.
The court’s analysis ended with a brief plain language
156
argument. The court stated that civil actions are litigated in
district court, so they are inherently beyond the exclusivity of the
workers’ compensation system that deprives plaintiffs of jury
157
trials. The opinion avoided further statutory considerations and
seemingly jumped to the conclusion that the civil action described

compensation act has not given plaintiff an adequate substitute remedy.”). One
central component of the Breimhorst holding was that when the legislature replaces
a common-law cause of action, which formerly involved the right to jury trial, with
a “new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy,” then “the legislature may
withhold the right of jury trial.” Id. at 411–12, 35 N.W.2d at 723.
154. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 675 (calling Breimhorst’s claims “completely
different” from Schmitz’s); see also Befort, supra note 139, at 16 (“The court was
careful to differentiate Schmitz’s retaliatory discharge claim from general claims
for workers’ benefits that do not create an entitlement to a jury trial.”).
155. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 675–76 (“Breimhorst does not support the
concurrence and dissent’s position. There, the cause of action was new, adequate,
and fundamentally different, but here the retaliatory discharge cause of action,
while new to workers’ compensation, is not fundamentally different than such
causes of action under the common law. In actuality, it is fundamentally the
same.”).
156. The court devotes a mere paragraph to the plain language
considerations. See id. at 677; cf. David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (2013) (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly
emphasizes plain language and evades analysis of statutory purpose). Because the
court concluded the language was plain and the meaning straightforward, the
majority did not engage in statutory analysis to decipher the significance of “civil
action” or speculate on the legislative purpose. See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677.
157. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677. Even this characterization of the court’s
holding involves some gap filling. Technically speaking, the court never links this
exclusivity issue with the jury trial issue. See id. (“[C]ivil actions, which are litigated
in district court, are outside the workers’ compensation system and damages
awarded on the claim do not constitute workers’ compensation benefits.”). If
anything, the court’s limited statutory interpretation is for the sake of concluding
that exclusivity does not govern.
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in section 176.82 enjoys an inherent, concomitant right to a civil
158
jury trial based on precedent alone.
C.

Justice Anderson’s Dissent

Justice Anderson dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice
159
Gildea and Justice Dietzen. The dissenters thought the salient
consideration was that the cause of action arose under the
umbrella of the comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme,
160
which generally involves no right to a jury trial. The dissent
focused on the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide
161
for a “jury trial.”
While the majority saw section 176.82 as
expanding remedies available to plaintiffs beyond the bounds of
162
the dissent instead saw this statutory retaliatory
the WCA,
163
discharge action as a “unique remedy” constrained to the WCA.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the court ultimately came to the correct conclusion,
it neglected a meaningful avenue of analysis: statutory
164
interpretation. The majority’s heavy reliance on case law alone
was misplaced considering the tumultuous history of inconsistent
165
treatment of section 176.92 claims. To clarify conflicting case law
and more effectively compensate for the ambiguities in the WCA,
the court could have engaged in statutory interpretation in
166
addition to its analysis of precedent.
158. See id. at 674.
159. See id. at 678–83 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 678.
161. Id.
162. Practitioners have hypothesized that expanding retaliatory discharge
claims to district court may also expand the number of claims brought by
plaintiffs. Minnesota State Supreme Court Finds Right to Jury Trial for Worker
Compensation Retaliation Claims, 30 TERMINATION EMP. BULL. no. 10, Oct. 2014.
163. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 681 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
164. See John E. Simonett, Rules of Statutory Construction and the Florida Election
Law, BENCH & B., July 2001, at 31, 33, http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar
/2001/jul01/essay.htm (“[I]f the meaning of a statute is at issue, apply those
interpretive canons that are appropriate to the situation to arrive at a meaning
that is reasonable, honest with the language, and true to the statute’s purpose.”).
165. See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text.
166. See 3B NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 75:3 (7th ed. 2011) (“Courts construing workers’
compensation statutes, federal and state, employ the usual maxims of construction
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Admittedly, the Ewert standard (providing that “[t]he right to a
jury trial must be found either in the Minnesota Constitution or
provided specifically by statute”) would seem to suggest that the
constitutional route of analysis is appropriate in Schmitz because the
statute does not explicitly provide for jury trial. While legally sound
in theory, this Ewert standard is unworkable in practice. First and
foremost, it presupposes that legislators know about the Ewert
framework for jury trials. It further expects legislators to use magic
167
words to provide for jury trials. Although the separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches provides
checks and balances, it does little to ensure a mutual
understanding of statutory construction and interpretation.
Because the bifurcated Ewert standard is challenging for the
legislature to apply, it is correspondingly problematic for the
judiciary to rely on it. Setting the Ewert framework aside, statutory
interpretation would have been a viable means to resolve the
question of whether the legislature intended to provide for a jury
trial in section 176.82 claims.
This section begins by establishing why it was an error for the
168
court to gloss over the ambiguity of the term “civil action.” It will
169
then briefly explore two textual canons of construction that
170
would have been particularly useful here: noscitur a sociis and lex
171
Finally, this note applies Justice Breyer’s purposive
specialis.
approach to statutory interpretation to Schmitz in an effort to
incorporate the complex legislative purposes that lurk beneath the
172
allegedly plain language of section 176.82.
. . . .”). But cf. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950),
(finding “two opposing canons on almost every point.”).
167. But see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.89, subdiv. 2 (2014) (“A person charged
with a petty misdemeanor is not entitled to a jury trial but shall be tried by a judge
without a jury.”); Id. § 117.165, subdiv. 1 (“In all eminent domain proceedings . . .
the petitioner shall be entitled to a jury trial.”); Id. § 260B.163 (providing some
juvenile hearings “shall be without a jury” whereas others include “the right to a
jury trial on the issue of guilt.”); Id. § 611A.79, subdiv. 5 (“The right to trial by jury
is preserved in an action brought under this section.”).
168. See infra Part IV.A.
169. “[C]anons of construction are never the masters of the courts, but merely
their servants, to aid them in ascertaining the legislative intent.” Ott v. Great N. Ry.
Co., 70 Minn. 50, 55, 72 N.W. 833, 834 (1897) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
170. See infra Part IV.B.1.
171. See infra Part IV.B.2.
172. See infra Part IV.C.
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The Court Erred in Finding Plain Meaning

If the meaning of a statute is plain in its language, then courts
173
need not engage in statutory interpretation; rather, they must
174
simply enforce the words of the statute as written. Though the
majority opinion devotes one paragraph to contemplating the plain
language of the statute, it does little more than raise the issue and
quickly conclude that civil actions, litigated in district court, are
175
outside the workers’ compensation system. By only using the
language of the statute to interpret the exclusivity issue, the court
misses a meaningful opportunity to see what the statute’s language
might indicate about the jury trial issue.
176
Clearly the meaning of section 176.82 is not as plain as the
177
court makes it out to be. After all, for nearly forty-five years
173. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990,
1065–67 (2001) (providing an overview of statutory interpretation methods from
1500 to present).
174. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
175. Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Minn. 2014) (citing Karnes v. Quality
Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1995)).
176. Surely the legislature could have more carefully drafted section 176.82 to
explicitly provide for both a “civil action” and a “civil jury trial.” See Paul J. Zech,
Federal Pre-Emption and State Exclusive Remedy Issues in Employment Litigation, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 325, 347 (1996) (“Significant rights and defenses relating to employment
should not be left to succeed or fail based on needless judicial harmonizing of
statutes which could have been avoided merely by proper drafting and review of
the policy considerations behind the legislation.”). But, since the legislation itself
was unclear, the court should have embraced the ambiguity and engaged in
“judicial harmonizing of the statutes.” See id.
177. This is not the first time that the Minnesota Supreme Court “took the
easy way out” and glazed over ambiguities in favor of finding plain meaning. See,
e.g., James Schoeberl, Constitutional Law: How Minnesota Unconstitutionally Broadened
Its Assisted-Suicide Statute—State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 398,
422 (2015) (“Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute does not define the term ‘assist,’
and the plain-meaning interpretation adopted by the court is inappropriate
because assistance requires some physical action.”); see also Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 885 (1930) (“[I]f [judges] will play fast and
loose with ‘plain meanings’ . . . they can not hope to convince laymen that they are
acting rationally or usefully.”).
Although this author lacked the time and resources to conduct further
research on this issue, there may be a need for further empirical analysis. Perhaps
this phenomenon of erroneously finding plain meaning extends beyond Schmitz. It
would be interesting to see how frequently the court finds plain meaning and to
consider whether this frequency has changed over time. For further guidance, see
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Minnesota courts vacillated as to whether or not the civil action
178
implicated a civil jury trial. Additionally, section 176.82 arises
under the umbrella of the WCA, which is bereft of jury trials
179
altogether. In light of these ambiguities, the case was ripe for
statutory analysis.
B.

Textual Canons of Statutory Interpretation
1.

Noscitur a sociis: “Civil Action” Elsewhere in the WCA and
Retaliatory Discharge Statutes

The maxim noscitur a sociis means “a word is known by the
180
company it keeps.” In statutory interpretation, this means that
when a word is ambiguous, its meaning can be ascertained by
181
reference to its use throughout the statute or act. The phrase
182
“civil action” is used seven times in the WCA. Sometimes the
183
language even details “civil actions in district court.” This is
significant because the term should have the same meaning
184
185
throughout the WCA. Though “civil action” is never defined,
these other seven uses shed light on the fact that the drafters
understood the distinctiveness of civil actions and workers’

Driesen, supra note 156, exploring a similar phenomenon in U.S. Supreme Court
cases and suggesting that the Court increasingly evades statutory interpretation.
178. Compare Karnes, 532 N.W.2d at 563 (describing section 176.82 actions as
“outside the purview” of the WCA), with Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d
1238, 1246 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[W]here a state legislature enacts a provision within
its workers’ compensation laws and creates a specific right of action, a civil action
brought to enforce that right of action is, by definition, a civil action arising under
the workers’ compensation laws of that state . . . .”). See generally supra notes 113–20
and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465 (1991).
181. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487,
496 (Minn. 2009).
182. MINN. STAT. §§ 176.145, 176.194, subdiv. 1, 176.295, subdiv. 2, 176.351,
subdiv. 3, 176.411, subdiv. 2, 176.471, subdiv. 9, 176.511, subdiv. 4 (2014). The
term is surely used numerous times in other Minnesota statutes, but the WCA is
distinct and is therefore all that is examined.
183. See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.295, subdiv. 2, 176.351, subdiv. 3, 176.411, subdiv.
2.
184. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 872 (1992) (“To change interpretive horses in midstream
would defeat the expectations of the legislators who enacted a statute.”).
185. See MINN. STAT. § 176.011.
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186

compensation actions. By providing for civil actions in district
courts, the drafters left the door open to jury trials for section
176.82 claimants.
It is also useful to look to the language the legislature used in
other retaliatory discharge acts. In the Whistleblower Act, for
example, the statute only provides for a “civil action,” failing to
187
expressly provide for a jury trial much like in section 176.82. In
the statute prohibiting retribution against pregnant employees, the
remedies provision specifies the employee “may bring a civil action
188
to recover any and all damages recoverable at law.” At the bare
minimum, juxtaposing these various retaliatory discharge statutes
would have shown that providing for a “civil action,” and no more,
is not incompatible with courts superimposing the right to a jury
trial. The court should have engaged in this sort of comparative
analysis of related statutes to buttress its finding that civil actions
under section 176.82 are entitled to civil jury trials.
2.

Lex specialis: Specific Terms of Section 176.82 Trump the
General Provisions of the WCA

Another helpful Latin maxim of statutory interpretation is lex
189
specialis, meaning “the specific trumps the general.” In other
words, a law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law that
190
only governs general matters. The court could have applied this
principle in Schmitz to contend that the specific provisions of
section 176.82, providing plaintiffs with a “civil action,” trump the
general denial of jury trials in workers’ compensation matters.
186. Section 176.145 states, “[N]otice . . . may be served . . . upon any agent of
the employer upon whom a summons may be served in a civil action.” This
suggests methods of service in civil actions are separate from, but bear on, service
in WCA actions. Section 176.194, subdivision 1 similarly provides that “[e]vidence
of violations under this section shall not be admissible in any civil action,” again
indicating that typically WCA cases are separate from civil cases.
187. Compare MINN. STAT. § 181.935, with MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1.
188. MINN. STAT. § 181.944 (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1902); see also
MINN. STAT. § 645.08(3) (“[G]eneral words are construed to be restricted in their
meaning by preceding particular words.”).
190. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522 (1996); Rodgers, 185 U.S. at 89
(“[T]he special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the
general act or provision.”); Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 399,
115 N.W.2d 22, 26 (1962) (“It is the rule that specific provisions in a statute
control general provisions.”).
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While this alone would not resolve the case—after all, a civil action
does not necessarily mean a civil jury trial—it lends support to the
court’s holding and would have fortified its legal reasoning.
Analogous to lex specialis is the notion that the new trumps the
191
old. The WCA was enacted over sixty years before the legislature
192
amended it to include section 176.82 claims.
Although the
legislature desired to eliminate jury trials in all workers’
compensation cases when it was first enacted in 1913, the
193
perspective had shifted by 1975 when section 176.82 was added.
The newer conception of employee rights envisioned that the
194
outcome of employment disputes would be in the jury’s hands.
Section 645.08 directs courts that statutory canons of interpretation
govern, but only to the extent that the interpretation is consistent
195
with the intent of the legislature. This would suggest that the
Schmitz court could have devoted more attention to the more
recent advent of employment laws, and that this legislative intent
would have trumped the century-old purposes of the WCA as a
whole.
C.

A Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation

Thus far, this case note has only considered textual canons of
196
construction, which are far from infallible. The court’s arsenal in
191. See Fink, 262 Minn. at 399, 115 N.W.2d at 26 (“[I]f there is conflict
between different statutes as to the same matter, the later statute prevails.”). The
Latin maxim for this is leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. See Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, it is generally used
when two statutes are in direct conflict, in which case the newer controls. See, e.g.,
Fink, 262 Minn. at 399, 115 N.W.2d at 26.
192. See supra notes 31, 78.
193. Compare supra note 31, and supra note 33, with supra note 78, and supra
note 87.
194. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
195. MINN. STAT. § 645.08 (2014).
196. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that “rote repetition” and “wooden reliance
on those canons” of interpretation can cause unfair results); Thomas A. Bishop,
The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in Connecticut: A Case Study, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 825, 846 (2009) (“Even though the plain meaning rule, and the canons of
construction more generally, have a substantial pedigree, their value as useful
tools of interpretation has received substantial criticism.”); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
816 (1983) (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not
constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the
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statutory interpretation is not limited to analyzing the words
197
alone. To do so would be to fall into the same trap as the Schmitz
198
court when it analyzed case law but neglected the statute.
Interpreting the text in isolation is often insufficient to effectively
199
elucidate the meaning of a statute. One supplemental avenue of
analysis is the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, which
relies heavily on the underlying purpose of the legislation in
200
construing the statutory language.
appearance that his decisions are constrained.”); Max Radin, A Short Way with
Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 423 (1942) (“In all this what room is there for the
standard ‘canons of interpretations,’ for ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and the
entire coterie or band of phrases and tags and shibboleths which are so
wearisomely familiar? I should be tempted to deny that they have ever resolved an
honest doubt . . . .”).
197. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 708 (1995) (portraying “text, structure, and legislative history” as a trio of
interpretive sources).
198. The “trap” in statutory interpretation is when courts rely so heavily on
textualism at the expense of purposive considerations. Textualism stands in stark
contrast to purposivism, insisting that “judges should almost never consult, and
never rely on, the legislative history of a statute.” William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1998). To analogize
to contract interpretation, this “four-corners” view is arguably doomed at the
outset—it “either den[ies] the relevance of the intention of the parties or
presuppose[s] a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not
attained.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 644, 646 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the refusal to consider extrinsic evidence
to aid in interpreting an indemnity clause constituted reversible error).
199. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford et al., A Case Study in the Superiority of the
Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221,
263 (2012) (“With today’s complex regulatory state, considering statutory text in a
vacuum will not yield the true meaning of a statute, but considering legislative
purpose will.”); see also Eskridge, supra note 173, at 990 (advocating “a
sophisticated methodology that knit[s] together text, context, purpose, and
democratic and constitutional norms in the service of carrying out the judiciary’s
constitutional role”).
200. Gifford et al., supra note 199, at 224–25 (“After uncovering the purpose
of the legislation, Justice Breyer then interprets the statutory language in a manner
that fulfills these goals.”). In light of this, advocates of the purposive approach
would likely find the temporal order of this note a bit confusing. They may have
felt the topic of purposive approach should have preceded the other two canons
considered here. Nonetheless, this author feels the strength of the purposive
approach is best used as a supplement when textual considerations alone leave the
analysis lacking. There seems to be no reason that the court could not turn to the
purposive approach subsequently to supplement other canons and interpretive
tools.
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Notably, this purposive approach is largely objective, looking
broadly at the legislative context, as opposed to the subjective
202
intents of particular drafters. In a way, it personifies the statute,
trying to look into the mind of the statute as opposed to the brains
203
of the legislators. At the same time, the purposive approach
acknowledges the legislative body behind the statute; this aligns
with the notion of judicial deference and the judicial branch
204
serving as a “subordinate ‘honest agent’ of the legislative body.”
Although Justice Breyer is often credited with the purposive
205
approach, he is simply an advocate of what section 645.16 already
206
enables the courts to consider.

201. This author notes the possibility that despite its objective intentions, the
purposive approach could fall victim to the same subjectivity and judicial
discretion as with the textual canons of interpretation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice
Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1741 (2006) (mentioning “the
difficulty of characterizing purposes . . . without an evaluative judgment of the
interpreter’s own [purpose]”).
202. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A
Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 730 (2009) (“A purposive
approach, on the other hand, seeks to attribute a purpose to the law in question
by looking at objective elements, such as the language of the statute and certain
types of legislative history, to determine what the statute seeks to achieve. The
question is not what particular drafters sought to achieve, but what the statutory
language and legislative history show the statute seeks to achieve.”). Contra Posner,
supra note 196, at 817 (“The judge should try to think his way as best he can into
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the
statute applied to the case at bar.”).
203. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 52 (N.Y. 1989) (suggesting
that a statute is a creature in and of itself, and that “a court’s role is not to delve
into the minds of legislators, but rather to effectuate the statute by carrying out
the purpose of the statute as it is embodied in the words chosen by the
Legislature.”). But see Sunstein, supra note 201, at 1739 (suggesting that legislative
purpose cannot be found, and is instead always attributed to the legislature).
204. Carlos E. Gonzalez, The 2006 David J. Stouffer Lecture: Statutory
Interpretation: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 703, 710 (2006)
(“[W]hen interpreting statutes, agent courts should act on behalf of the legislative
principal, rather than on their own behalf.”).
205. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“[T]he textual question considered alone is a close one. . . . I
would look to other sources, including legislative history, statutory purpose, and
the views of the federal administrative agency. . . .”).
206. Although this note does not aim to provide a comprehensive history of
statutory interpretation, it is interesting to have some historical perspective on the
matter. “Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Court subscribed to the
traditional purposivist framework,” as exemplified by the 1892 case Holy Trinity
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Section 645.16 is, in many ways, a codification of this purposive
207
approach. It provides that “the object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
208
the legislature.” When a statute’s language is not entirely clear,
courts can determine the statute’s meaning by considering various
factors, such as (1) “the occasion and necessity for the law,” (2)
“the circumstances under which it was enacted,” and (3) “the
209
contemporaneous legislative history.” This note will now examine
these three sources in interpreting the statute at issue in Schmitz.
1.

The Occasion and Necessity for the Law

First, the occasion and necessity for the law prohibiting
retaliatory discharge was protecting workers and safeguarding their
statutory right to workers’ compensation. Section 176.82 sought to
protect workers from being fired for exercising their statutory right

Church v. United States. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
113, 113 (2011); see also Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892) (referencing the “spirit” and “intention” of the lawmakers). It was not until
the final decade of the twentieth century that “statutory interpretation wars” began
and the purposive model was challenged. Manning, supra note 206, at 113; Abbe
R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1843–44 (2010).
207. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2014). Although statutory interpretation occurs
at the state supreme courts and the Supreme Court alike, much of the scholarly
debate on statutory interpretation comes from federal law “where . . . no agreed
methodological rules exist.” Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking,
96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 583 n.83 (2011). As a result, state courts can create and
employ their own rules. Id. At one point, Connecticut had adopted the purposive
approach in all matters of statutory interpretation, even when the language was
unambiguous. See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 578 (Conn. 2003) (“[W]e
ordinarily will consider all of those sources beyond the language itself, without first
having to cross any threshold of ambiguity of the language.”). However, within a
matter of months this was superseded by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1–2z
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“If . . . the meaning of [statutory] text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”); see
also Paul Dinto Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 835 A.2d 33, 39 n.10
(Conn. 2003) (acknowledging that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s purposive
approach had been legislatively overruled). As Courchesne demonstrates, while state
courts are free to innovate in methods of statutory interpretation, they ultimately
must answer to the state legislatures.
208. MINN. STAT. § 645.16.
209. Id.
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210

to workers’ compensation. The right to compensation under the
WCA would be meaningless if an employee could be fired for
211
utilizing his or her benefits. As part of the compensation bargain,
employees gave up the right to traditional negligence actions, but
they did not agree to suffer reprisal for exercising their legal right
to compensation.
The legislature clearly viewed the threat of retaliatory
discharge as a serious matter, so much so that the statute provides
212
for punitive damages. The threat of treble damages serves as a
deterrent to employers, endeavoring to shield employees from
213
retaliatory discharge. The Minnesota Supreme Court has even
commented on this connection between protecting employees and
214
punishing employers in several prior section 176.82 cases.
Looking at the necessity for the law would have helped the
Schmitz court reinforce its holding that the exclusivity of the WCA
did not govern and the salient consideration was instead workers’
rights. To protect employees receiving benefits under the WCA, it
makes sense to have a provision that provides for the oversight of
215
the civil court system —and the oversight of a jury, as well.
210. Id. § 176.82.
211. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employees and/or Frozen-Out
Shareholders (an Essay), 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1996) (“The premise
of these statutes [prohibiting retaliatory discharge] is that rights guaranteed
employees would be hollow if employers could terminate employees who assert
statutory rights.”).
212. MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (“[P]unitive damages not to exceed three times the
amount of any compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled”). The
statute even provides for costs and reasonable attorney fees, which is further
indicative of a worker-friendly purpose. See id. It also indicates that the damages
awarded are not to be offset by workers’ compensation benefits received. Id.
213. See Steefel, supra note 92, at 470 (“[T]he possibility of punitive damages
being awarded will deter employers from discharging at-will employees who refuse
to violate a statutory or constitutional provision.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 549.20
(“Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and
convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for
the rights or safety of others.”); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill.
1978).
214. See, e.g., Bergeson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn.
1987) (discussing treble punitive damages as “a kind of damages reserved
traditionally for conduct which is outrageous”); Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310
N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (viewing punitive damages as reflective of a dual
“concern for employees’ welfare” and “a desire to punish employers and deter
them from the forbidden conduct.”).
215. See Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1984)
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The Circumstances Under Which the Law Was Enacted

Second, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
section 176.82 reflect a broader commitment to prohibitions on
retaliatory discharge. The statute was enacted during an era in
216
which the legislature sought to protect workers’ rights generally.
This emphasis on protecting individuals in the course of their
employment,
whether
for
whistleblowing
or
workers’
compensation, was seen as an exception to the common-law rule of
at-will employment. In the years leading up to and following the
passage of section 176.82, the courts were increasingly willing to
217
carve out exceptions to the doctrine.
Perhaps this can be
extrapolated to support the proposition that the legislature was also
willing to carve out an exception to the exclusivity principle of the
WCA. The environment surrounding the enactment demonstrates
that retaliatory discharge was an increasingly respected cause of
action that merited protections, both from the legislature by way of
statutes and from the judicial branch by way of case law.
3.

The Contemporaneous Legislative History

Finally, the contemporaneous legislative history can provide
218
valuable insight into the intent of the legislature. Unlike analysis
of legislative intent, which focuses solely on the purposes of the
(“The only effective way to prevent an employer from interfering with his
employees’ rights to seek compensation is to recognize that [the employee] has a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the discharge is motivated by the
desire to punish the employee for seeking the benefits to which he is entitled by
law.”); Ann-Marie Ahern, Fight Back Against Retaliation, TRIAL, June 2002, at 45
(“[W]orkers should not have to choose between their livelihoods and their health.
If an employer can intimidate employees or punish them for seeking redress, then
the employer could render workers’ protection under those statutes null.”).
216. See supra Part II.C.1–.2.
217. See, e.g., supra note 93 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087, 1091–93, 1095 (Or.
1978) (engaging in analysis of legislative history of statutes relating to unlawful
employment practices before holding plaintiff was entitled to file common-law
action for wrongful discharge). But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1833, 1884 (1998) (“In other respects, however, consulting legislative history
for evidence of general purpose may aggravate, rather than alleviate, the problem
of judicial competence. . . . [E]vidence of general purpose in the legislative history
often involves political, social, or economic problems that are nonlegal and highly
controversial . . . .”).

13 (Do Not Delete)

480

3/24/2016 7:59 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:446

legislators that took part in the drafting efforts, analysis of
219
legislative history reveals broader purposes and intentions. With
regards to section 176.82, the legislative history is rather
uncomplicated. Less than four months elapsed between its first
220
reading and its passage, and only two committees considered the
221
legislation. There is no record of contentious debate or any
222
revisions during this time. But this absence of history, in and of
itself, may be indicative of the legislative support behind this
newfound action for retaliatory discharge in the workers’
compensation context. The lack of debate on the “civil action”
versus “civil jury trial” matter may also suggest that the legislature
simply assumed they could provide for a “civil action” and that the
courts would automatically imbue this language with the right to
civil jury trial, as jury trials were traditionally associated with other
223
retaliatory discharge actions.
While the legislative history of
section 176.82 may not be rich with information, the lack thereof
224
speaks for itself.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Courts have little to lose by engaging in statutory
interpretation, particularly when the effort is concurrent with a
careful consideration of case law. The legislature specifically

219. See generally Vermeule, supra note 218, at 1883–85 (discussing two
varieties of legislative intent—specific intent versus general legislative purpose);
Radin, supra note 177, at 872 (criticizing legislative intent as “undiscoverable in
fact, irrelevant if it were discovered . . . [and] a queerly amorphous piece of
slag.”).
220. This author went to the Minnesota Historical Society Library in Saint
Paul, Minnesota, to research the statute’s legislative history. The archival legislative
records revealed that the bill was first read on February 20, 1975, and ultimately
passed on June 5, 1975.
221. Section 176.82 was referred to the Committee on Governmental
Operations on February 20, 1975, after its first reading. A Conference Committee
on the matter was appointed on May 13, 1975.
222. Neither the House nor Senate Journals included any supplemental
transcripts, audio taped discussions, committee minutes, or notes regarding
debate within the committees or on the floor of the House or Senate.
223. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
224. But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 530 n.13 (1985)
(“[C]ongressional silence, no matter how ‘clanging,’ cannot override the words of
the statute.”); Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.
1983) (“Not every silence is pregnant . . . .”).
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empowered the courts through section 645.16 to look at factors
such as the necessity for the law, the circumstances of its
225
enactment, and the related legislative history.
And as the
Minnesota Supreme Court intelligently observed in Karst v. F.C.
Hayer Co., “If we have incorrectly defined the legislative intent, the
226
legislature may quickly correct us.”
Though section 176.82 carved out a civil action for plaintiffs in
1975, it was not until 2014 that the Minnesota Supreme Court
confirmed that this civil action for retaliatory discharge under the
227
WCA indeed includes the civil right to a jury trial, as well.
What matters is not so much the jury trial itself—after all, very
228
few cases actually get to trial —but the image of getting to the
jury. If a WCA retaliation case were to go to trial, the jury would
229
likely be sympathetic to the plaintiff. Retaliatory discharge adds
insult to literal injury: first the plaintiff is hurt at work, and then he
gets fired because of it. This would likely increase the settlement
values of section 176.82 claims as the potential for a million dollar
230
jury verdict would presumably encourage employers to settle.
The flip side of this risk of high jury verdicts is that it may scare
employers, who could be more apt to foreclose the possibility of
section 176.82 retaliation claims when an employee settles his

225. See supra Part IV.C.
226. 447 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn. 1989).
227. Law of June 4, 1975, ch. 359, §§ 21, 23, 1975 Minn. Laws 1188 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1 (2014)); Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669,
677 (Minn. 2014).
228. Marshall H. Tanick, Trial by Jury Arduous Attempts to Appropriate and Avert,
BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2012, at 25 (noting that “no more than 5 percent of all
civil cases ever reach juries” and attributing this to the growing emphasis on
alternative dispute resolution).
229. See Ahern, supra note 215, at 45 (“Unlike employment discrimination
cases, retaliation cases involve motives that juries readily understand: The idea that
an employer may want to rid its workforce of employees who file costly
compensation claims is plausible to jurors who may see corporate America as
greedy. Jurors are also quick to understand the highly offensive nature of
retaliation. The idea that an employer could terminate an employee simply
because he or she sought redress for a work-related injury offends fundamental
notions of fairness.”).
230. Robin Potter, Collateral Tort Claims in Employment Law—The Tort of
Retaliatory Discharge, in 1 ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA CLE 363
(2000), 2000 WL 1120401 (“[T]he tort of retaliatory discharge[] has resulted in
high verdicts and hotly litigated cases.”).

13 (Do Not Delete)

482

3/24/2016 7:59 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:446

231

workers’ compensation case.
In other words, settlement
agreements within the administrative system may increasingly
include provisions that the employee fully releases all future civil
actions under section 176.82. This occasionally happened prior to
232
Schmitz, but employers may be inclined to do so more frequently
due to the looming threat of large jury awards.
The impact of Schmitz should not be exaggerated, however. In
the year since it was decided, it has only been cited by one
233
Minnesota court in an unpublished opinion. The Schmitz holding
does not open the floodgates to an onslaught of retaliatory
discharge claims, as plaintiffs still must prove not only wrongful
termination, but the causal nexus to the exercise of workers’
234
compensation rights. Nonetheless, if a plaintiff can jump through
235
these hoops, he has the potential to see a substantial jury verdict.
231. See MINN. STAT. § 176.521 (“The commissioner, a compensation judge,
and the district court shall exercise discretion in approving or disapproving a
proposed settlement.”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., supra note 61
(discussing compromise and release agreements, also known as “stipulations for
settlement”).
232. See, e.g., Weilder v. Johanning Trans-Fare, Inc., No. WC05-147, 2005 WL
1901570, at *2 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (reviewing
employee’s petition to vacate a stipulation for settlement that was executed solely
to eliminate a close out of section 176.82 claims).
233. McDonal v. SuperValu, Inc., No. A14-1228, 2015 WL 1401636, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015). Schmitz has technically been cited in two cases, but
in one instance it was for an issue unrelated to the retaliatory discharge claims. See
Kaufenberg v. Winkley Co., No. A14-1514, 2015 WL 3539744, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 8, 2015) (citing Schmitz only for the Faragher/Ellerth issue).
234. See Gary & Tanick, supra note 109, at n.14 (discussing the floodgates
concern after Abraham, which permitted jury trials for retaliatory discharge actions
under the Whistleblower Act); James T. Mellon, Michigan Worker’s Compensation
Retaliation Tort: Its Origin and Development, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 61, 88–89
(2002) (“The cause of action is difficult for a plaintiff to prove because an
employer rarely announces that the reason for the discriminatory conduct is in
retaliation for the employee’s asserting a right under the Michigan Worker's
Disability Compensation Act.”).
235. For example, one (admittedly outdated) survey showed that plaintiffs in
wrongful termination suits in California received punitive damages averaging
$494,000. William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for
Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404, 406 (1987). However, the countervailing factor is
that Minnesota’s statute limits punitive damages to “three times the amount of any
[workers’] compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled.” MINN. STAT.
§ 176.82. Further diminishing this risk is the cost of litigation generally. See
Yonover, supra note 90, at 93 (“It could cost an employee over $10,000 just to get
to trial; the judicial process is both expensive and lengthy.”).
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On a larger scale, the Schmitz decision is yet another case in the
line of retaliatory discharge cases. It further entrenches employee
rights by giving teeth to the statutory promise of a civil action.
Although Minnesota does not have a general public policy
prohibition on retaliatory discharge, cases like Schmitz contribute to
an across-the-board expansion of wrongful discharge law in
Minnesota. Hopefully Schmitz will signal to legislators how future
statutes should be drafted to provide for civil jury trials in other
236
retaliatory discharge statutes or other WCA causes of action.
Though the court’s conclusion is sound, its rationale is
lacking. The Minnesota Supreme Court could have strengthened
its analysis by not only reconciling the conflicting case law but also
reconciling statutory ambiguities. Had the court bolstered its
reasoning with the principles of statutory interpretation, it would
have diminished the likelihood of further challenges to the
meaning of section 176.82.

236. See Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 74, 93 N.W.2d 690,
698 (1958) (“[T]he legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of
its words . . . .”). Whether or not Schmitz will prove instructive and affect the
legislature’s drafting of future statutes remains to be seen, but without my rosecolored glasses on, I am less than optimistic about the prospect.

